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RELIGIOUS
DISCRIMINATION IN
INSTITUTIONS AND
SERVICES
VINCENT C. ALLRED*
As you will note from your programs, the topic for this hour is "Reli-
gious Discrimination in Institutions and Services." There will probably be
contraception, sterilization, and all those other delightful subjects. How-
ever, we will be talking about religious discrimination per se-across the
board, let us say-rather than with respect to any particular type of opera-
tion within the institution.
By way of introduction, I am Vince Allred of the Office of General
Counsel and the gentleman on my right, I am sure you know, is J.P.
Darrouzet, attorney-at-law, of Austin, Texas. Actually, Bud should have
allowed us two or three hours for this discussion instead of 45 minutes.
However, we have to make the best of our 45 minutes. This is the way we
will work it: I will go on first and give you, hopefully, a few highlights on
the Constitutional aspects, some statutory provisions and, if the remaining
time permits, a bit about implementing regulations. Then J.P. will take
over and in his inimitable manner . . . well, let's put it this way: I'll put
you to sleep and he will wake you up.
The subject may be considered under two general aspects.
A. Constitutional
"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion,
or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. .. ."
"No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection
of the laws ... "2
The forgoing Constitutional provisions are couched in terminology of
state action, and such state action should seem a necessity to bring either
*Office of General Counsel, United States Catholic Conference.
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
2 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
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provis:on into play. The threshold question therefore is whether such state
action is present. While we do not know of any definite judicial pronounce-
ments relative to state action where religious discrimination or preference
is alleged, the question has arisen relative to discriminations allegedly
founded on race, discipline, and sex, in sectarian institutions.
1. Race
In Green v. Connolly3 it was held that tax exemption, under Section
501(c)(3),4 should be denied to any nonpublic school which discriminated
on the ground of race relative to its student admission policy.
The schools involved were not sectarian institutions. However, the
Internal Revenue Service has applied the doctrine to parochial schools of
the Catholic Church and certification of a racially non-discriminatory pol-
icy is necessary for listing a parochial school in the Official Catholic Direc-
tory, as you will note from checking the Annual Group Ruling for 1972. 5
2. Discipline
In Bright v. Isenbarger, the court refused to interfere with explusion
of a student by a Catholic high school, the student alleging that such
expulsion had been for an insufficient cause and without notice or hearing.
It was urged that the school was inbued with state action because of ex-
emption from property and income tax, extension to its students of the
benefits of public transportation and the lunch program, and its qualifica-
tion under the state's compulsory education law.
It is highly interesting that the district court gave serious considera-
tion to the effect on sectarian institutions of decisions finding state action
relative to racial discrimination. The Court of Appeals weighing on this
point said:
The district court observed that only 'state action' is within the prohibitions
of the Fourteenth Amendment and held that the plaintiffs had failed to
demonstrate the requisite governmental involvement. In so holding, the dis-
trict court reasoned that the 'state action' doctrine was developed in response
to efforts to eliminate racial discrimination. 314 F. Supp. at p. 1392. Accord-
ingly, it thought that there might be a less demanding standard of what
constitutes sufficient state involvement where there are allegations of racial
discrimination. 314 F. Supp. at 1394. We find it unnecessary to decide
whether state action cases not involving attacks on racial discrimination
require a more demanding standard of what constitutes sufficient state in-
volvement. In this case the state played no role in defendants' expulsion of
330 F. Supp. 1150 (D.C. Cir.), aff'd sub nom. Coit v. Green, 404 U.S. 997 (1971).
INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 501(c)(3).
IRS, TENTATIVE CUMULATIVE LIST OF ORGANIZATIONS, (pub. no. 78) (1972).
314 F. Supp. 1382 (N.D. Ind. 1970), aff'd, 445 F.2d 412 (7th Cir. 1971).
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plaintiffs. Furthermore, as the district court pointed out, other, more nebu-
lous, relationships between Indiana and this Catholic high school were insuf-
ficient to warrant attributing the expulsions of plaintiffs in any way to the
actions of the state (Footnote omitted).7
3. Sex-McClure v. Salvation Army"
Mrs. McClure, a former commissioned officer of the Salvation Army,
filed an action alleging violation of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title VII,
Section 703(a)' because her pay had been less than that of male officers
doing similar work. Very briefly, section 703(a) prohibited an employer
engaged in commerce from discriminating against any employee "because
of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin."'
The Court of Appeals found that Title VII was applicable to a religious
organization such as the Salvation Army. Even though the Salvation Army
was not actually engaged in commerce, its operations, employing as it did
3,000 persons, with an annual payroll of seven million dollars, and the
extent of its property holdings, would constitute it an "employer" engaged
in "industry affecting commerce," so as to bring it within the law."
However, it held that Mrs. McClure in her capacity of a commissioned
officer of the Salvation Army held a position equivalent to that of a minis-
ter of religion. 2
For this reason, it found that Congress had no constitutional power to
regulate her relationship to the Salvation Army. It said, in part:
[I]n addition to injecting the State into substantive ecclesiastical mat-
ters, an investigation and review of such matters of church administration
and government as a minister's salary, his place of assignment and his duty,
which involve a person at the heart of any religious organization, could only
produce by its coercive effect the very opposite of that separation of church
and State contemplated by the First Amendment. . . .We find that the
application of the provisions of Title VII to the employment relationship
existing between The Salvation Army and Mrs. McClure, a church and its
minister would result in an encroachment by the State into an area of reli-
gious freedom which it is forbidden to enter by the principles of the free
exercise clause of the First Amendment. 13
As will be noted, the Court of Appeals would subject a religious organiza-
tion to Title VII in respects other than concerning its relations to its minis-
ters of religion, suggesting a constitutional prohibition against any interfer-
ence with such relation.
445 F.2d at 413.
460 F.2d 553 (5th Cir.), cert. denied due to untimely filing, 409 U.S. 896, 1050 (1972).
42 U.S.C.A. § 2000(e)-2(a) (relating to equal employment opportunities).
Id.
42 U.S.C.A. § 2000(e)-(b), referred to in 460 F.2d at 557.
,2 460 F.2d at 555, 560.
Id. at 560.
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It is possible that the Equal Economic Opportunity Amendments of
1970, enacted since Mrs. McClure filed her action, may have extended the
insulation of religious organizations from application of Title VII in respect
to religious affiliation of their employees.
Abortion, Sterilization, etc.
All of you are familiar with recent litigation on these areas of conflict
between alleged personal right to the services involved and the right of the
church-related hospital or other institution to withhold them on the basis
of religious orientation. That topic will be discussed at greater length by
Mr. Darrouzet.
B. Statutory
1. Civil Rights Act of 1964
This Act is, of course, basic on statutory prohibition against discrimi-
nation. While enacted mainly with respect to racial discrimination, it spe-
cifically includes prohibitions against discrimination on grounds of race
and religion.
Title VI and VII are of concern to religious institutions.
Section 601 of Title VII" provides that no person shall, on grounds of
race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied
the benefits of, or subjected to discrimination under any program or activ-
ity receiving federal financial assistance.
It will be noted that the grounds of prohibitable discrimination are
race, color, and national origin. There is no mention of religious preference
or discrimination. Therefore, for instance, a Catholic parochial school may
not be denied such federal benefits as the school lunch program or partici-
pation in ESEA because it extends a preference in enrollment to Catholic
children. Title VI has nothing to do with discrimination or preference
founded on religion, and is not relevant to the rather specialized presenta-
tion which we are making.
Title VII, which concerns Equal Employment Opportunity, has been
the occasion of extensive administrative construction.
Section 703(a)(1)' 5 makes it an unlawful employment practice to dis-
criminate on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
This broad prohibition was modified by Section 702 of the 1964 Act'"
to the effect that Title VII does not apply to a religious corporation or
society with respect to work connected with the carrying on by such corpo-
ration or society of its religious activities. The same section provided also
" 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000(d).
15 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000(e)-2(a).
16 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000(e).
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for an exemption of educational institutions with respect to the employ-
ment of teaching personnel.
A section which might be considered as reinforcing the foregoing is
Section 703(e)(2),17 also known as the Purcell Amendment, was included
in the 1964 Act providing that "it shall not be an unlawful employment
practice for a school, college, university, or other educational institution
• . .to hire and employ employees of a particular religion if such school,
college, university . .. is, in whole or in substantial part, owned, sup-
ported, controlled, or managed by a particular religion or by a particular
religious corporation, association, or society .. ."I
It will be noted that there is a conflict between the two foregoing
sections. The broad exemption for all religious corporations and societies
in Section 702 was with reference only to their religious activities, while
Section 703(e)(2) having reference only to religiously affiliated schools and
colleges appears applicable to all employees, even if not engaged in reli-
gious activities.
Thus, the question might arise: While a church might undoubtedly
consider religious affiliation in selecting its minister of religion, could St.
Joseph's church then select an impoverished member of the parish with
ten children as its janitor, if application for the position was made at the
same time by an affluent atheist who might possess superior technical
qualifications for the job?
The Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 197211 amended Section
702 to read:
This title shall not apply to an employer with respect to . ..a religious
corporation, association, educational institution, or society, with respect to
the employment of individuals of a particular religion to perform work con-
nected with the carrying on by such corporation, association, educational
institution, or society of its activities.
It will be observed that this exemption is not limited to "religious
activities." No regulations have been published interpreting this 1972 leg-
islation. However, the General Counsel's office of the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission has informed us that several unpublished rulings
have upheld the right of a church-related educational institution to make
a distinction based on religion, even though the job category does not
involve religious activities.
Likewise, the Purcell Amendment remains intact. Based on the for-
egoing, it has been the opinion of the Office of General Counsel that Catho-
lic institutions are exempt from the religious discrimination provisions of
Title VII. We would assume that the courts, on the basis of legislative
history, would accept this view.
'1 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000(e)-2(e)(2).
' Id.
" Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103 (1972).
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However, as always, questions remain. One of them is the connotation
of the expression, "religious corporation, association, educational institu-
tion, or society."20 While we may be certain this would cover a diocese,
parish, monastery, or convent, there are categories of organizations where
such exemption might be challenged. There is no formal ruling with re-
spect to hospitals, but certainly it is arguable that the spirit and intent of
the amendment would extend to a hospital established under religious
auspices to perform its functions in pursuance with the religious motiva-
tion of its founders. For instance, if the religious order assigns a nun to the
position of administrator, there is a strong basis for contending that this
is appropriate under the law, even though there might be other applicants
seeking the position.
Of concern also is the recently promulgated Executive Order 11246,
designed to enforce equal employment opportunity without regard to race,
national origin, or creed, with respect to firms contracting with or federally
assisted by the government. This regulation is particularly directed to
areas of "under-utilization" of persons of particular races, national origins,
and creeds. Objection has been made by the USCC that this proposed
regulation, while motivated by worthy social consideration, is too broad in
its application and would interfere with the religious apostolate of church-
related institutions.
2. The Hill-Burton Act
The Hill-Burton Act 2' contains a provision that any facilities con-
structed through assistance under the Act will be made "available to all
persons residing in the territorial area of the applicant."
On the basis of the foregoing the Department of Health, Education
and Welfare has issued a regulation prohibiting discrimination against
patients on the basis of creed.Y
As noted, the Act and regulation deal only with admission and treat-
ment of patients, not to employment practices.
We do not know of any attempt having been made to extend the racial
pronouncements of Simkins v. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital2 3 to pro-
hibit church-affiliated hospitals from extending employment preference on
the basis of religion.
2" Id.
" 42 U.S.C. § 291(c)(e).
22 42 C.F.R. § 53.111.
323 F.2d 959 (4th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 938 (1964).
